Buddhism,  Christianity,  Interfaith

Evil, Cognition, and Relationality between Aquinas and Tsongkhapa:

A Comparative Approach by the Philosophy of the Inter-relational Network

1. Introduction

              The problem of evil is one of the persistent themes in the development of religious and philosophical thought. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) represent two central moments in the reflection of religious philosophy on this problem in the Christian and Buddhist traditions.

Both offer analyses of evil that draw on categories such as deprivation, cognitive error, and relationality. However, their hermeneutical perspectives follow distinct relational flows, with their source in different cosmologies and (de)ontologies.

              This exhibition adopts as a hermeneutic path the Philosophy of Inter-relational Network Theory, as conceptualized by Antônio Florentino Neto (2017) and systematized as a philosophy of contemporary hermeneutics by the author (2020; 2024).

The Philosophy of Inter-relational Network Theory offers instruments to “treat cultural preconceptions as a necessary condition for an understanding that leads to the overcoming of logical problems of language by postulating the complementarity between metaphysics and anti-metaphysics” (Tsai, 2024, p. 148).

              From this referential perspective, I briefly examine three dimensions: (1) the ontological definition of evil; (2) the role of cognition in the generation of evil; (3) the relational implications of these conceptions.

The hypothesis is that, although there are common points between the relational identity networks of the two thinkers, there are flows that are not in dialogue, are not common between the networks, and these are those that have an ultimate relationality of evil, differences that can be elucidated by the principles of mutual determination and complementary opposition (Tsai, 2020,  p. 189).

2. Thomas Aquinas: Evil as Deprivation

The Aquinian analysis of evil is inscribed in the flow of the element of ontology. Thus, evil does not have positive ontological consistency: “evil is not a nature or being, but an absence of good” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 48, a. 1). This formulation is characterized by the distinction between denial and deprivation.

Negation indicates the absence of undue perfection (a stone has no eyes); Deprivation designates the absence of perfection that should be present (a cat has eyes but cannot see because it is blind). Thus, evil is privatio boni: absence of due good (Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 48, a. 3).

We recognize evil by “comparing it with the fullness of being that is characteristic of a thing’s nature” (Stump and White, 2022, p. 215). This perspective allows Aquinas to face the theodicean problem without blaming divine goodness for falsehood: if evil is not something positively created, God cannot be considered its direct cause (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 10). Thus, “God is not the cause of evil; he only allows it to achieve greater goods” (Echavarría, 2013, p. 5)

Aquinas distinguishes between physical evil (suffering), such as natural imperfection, and moral evil, such as sin. Physical evil can be understood as a consequence of the finitude of the created world. Moral evil is based only on the freedom of the rational creature. Thus, with this division, Aquinas manages to avoid the conclusion that divine omnipotence must be abandoned, while maintaining that moral evil is something that “could not and should not have happened” (Deavel, 2007, p. 304).          

The relationality of evil manifests itself in two cognitive stages. In the first, evil is only intelligible in relation to the good it deprives: “we know one of the opposites through the other” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 48, a. 1). In the second, evil acquires meaning in the context of divine providence, where God “would not permit any evil in his works, unless he could derive good even from evil” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica III, q. 1, a. 1). Relationality, thus thought, does not have a symmetry between the elements, (evil depends on good, but good does not depend on evil).

3. Tsongkhapa: Evil as a Cognitive Error

              Tsongkhapa, founder of the Geluk school, is one of the most important interpreters of Madhyamaka philosophy (Oxford Bibliographies, 2023). His approach to evil is inscribed in the tradition of Nāgārjuna, which emphasizes emptiness (śūnyatā) and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda). All phenomena are void because they are void of inherent existence, existing only relationally, because of causes and conditions (Thurman, 2006, p. 45).

Applying the principle of mutual determination (Tsai, 2020, p. 156), evil would be a fundamental cognitive error whose effect is distortion through cognitive and conceptual projection, which takes as real (true) what is only conventional (false). This approach would avoid, in the wake of classical Buddhism, as provided for in the Four Noble Truths, both eternalism and nihilism (Ferraro, 2016, p. 26).

Tsongkhapa’s analysis has as its central element distorting ignorance (avidyā viparyasta) as the fundamental epistemic, and only then psychological, cause of suffering. Ignorance is an incorrect apprehension of reality as endowed with inherent existence; it is not, therefore, an error due to lack of information. The correct view of emptiness is not a mere philosophical belief, but a transformative realization that removes the root of cyclic existence” (Thurman, 2006, p. 78), so cognition is a source of evil (when distorted),  but in it is found the nature of overcoming evil (when not distorted).

Tsongkhapa rejects an eternal creator, considering such a notion incompatible with dependent origination (Thurman, 2006, p. 134). Thus, evil does not need to be a counterpoint justified by complementary opposition, but asymmetrical, with divine goodness. Evil is understood in its causes, so that its origin is reduced to a cognitive element that can be overcome by means of a path of rectification.

Given the differences between Tomas and Tsongkhapa, is there a possibility of inter-relational dialogue between elements of different thoughts, foundations in creation and self-organization?

4. Comparative Analysis by the Inter-relational Network

              Applying the principle of mutual determination (Tsai, 2020, p. 156), we identified significant convergences. Both reject attributing positive ontological status to evil, distancing themselves from positions of extremes, such as that of the Manichaeans of the sources of Christian patristics. Both have cognition as their central element: in Aquinas, evil is known as a referential absence in relation to good; and in Tsongkhapa, evil is error that distorts cognition.

In both, the overcoming of evil seems, in some way, to take place through a relational flow characterized by a correct apprehension of reality. From the point of view of the Philosophy of the Inter-relational Network, both ways of thinking contain in themselves, as a relational foundation, the principle of complementary opposites.

However, for Aquinas, evil is only fully understood in the relationship with God. Theodicy is necessary to show compatibility between divine goodness and the existence of evil. For Tsongkhapa, evil does not pose itself as a theological problem because there is no God whose goodness needs to be justified, within the flow of revealed reason. Evil arises by cause and effect within the domain of cognition itself; therefore, it can be explained by cognitive nature, within the flow of natural reason.

Applying the principle of complementary opposition (yin-yang) (Florentino Neto, 2017, p. 214; Tsai, 2020, p. 172), these conceptions do not cancel each other out but constitute complementary poles. Aquinian theodicy and Tsongkhapa’s causal analysis represent equally coherent answers to the same challenge in terms of logic and ethics.

The principle of interfusion (yuan rong), incorporated into the Inter-relational Network (Tsai, 2020, p. 178; 2024, p. 158), allows us to understand the relationship between these perspectives without reducing them to an inadequate synthesis. Interfusion means mutual penetration of different perspectives that, without losing specificity, illuminate each other. The Inter-relational Network makes it possible to overcome the supposed insurmountable distance between the two registers of world knowledge, so that there can be a (religious) inter-dialogue in research as a coexistence between metaphysics and anti-metaphysics.” (Tsai, 2024, p. 160).

5. Conclusion

              The inter-relational dialogue between Aquino and Tsongkhapa, guided by the Inter-relational Network (Tsai 2020; 2024), reveals how apparently similar problems receive solutions from different metaphysical commitments. Both reject the ontological positivity of evil and attribute to cognition a central role.

However, they do not dialogue with respect to ultimate relationality: for Aquinas, evil is intelligible in relation to God (revealed truth); for Tsongkhapa, in the network of self-organized conditioned relations (unrevealed truth).

This direct non-relationality does not invalidate the dialogue. The Inter-relational Network offers tools to treat traditions in their own historicities (Tsai, 2020, p. 215). The problem of evil is revealed as an interesting panorama for the philosophy of relational hermeneutics, where differences are understood as new moments for deepening between inter-relational networks and their inherent contrasts.


References

AQUINO, Tomás de. Suma Teológica. Porto Alegre: EST, 1980.

AQUINO, Tomás de. Suma Contra os Gentios. Porto Alegre: EST, 1990.

DEAVEL, C. J. Relational Evil, Relational Good. International Philosophical Quarterly, v. 47, n. 3, p. 297-313, 2007.

ECHAVARRÍA, A. Thomas Aquinas and the Debate on Evil. New Blackfriars, v. 94, p. 1-15, 2013.

FERRARO, G. Versos Fundamentais do Caminho do Meio. Campinas: Phi, 2016.

FLORENTINO NETO, A. Predicação e relação. In: FLORENTINO NETO, A.; GIACOIA JR., O. (org.). A Escola de Kyoto. Campinas: Phi, 2017. p. 201-230.

OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES. Tsongkhapa. Oxford, 2023.

STUMP, E.; WHITE, T. J. Evil, Sin, and Redemption. In: The New Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge: CUP, 2022. p. 213-235.

THURMAN, R. Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa. Dharamsala: LTWA, 2006.

TSAI, P. M. O Tao da China na Modernidade. Tese (Doutorado) – Unicamp, 2020.

TSAI, P. M. Os elementos da rede budista-taoísta. Modernos & Contemporâneos, Campinas, v. 8, n. 18, p. 147-165, 2024.

TSONGKHAPA. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2000-2004.


© Plinio Tsai, 2026. This work is licensed under Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

Cover Image: generated using AI (ChatGPT) by the author.

+ posts

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *